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ABSTRACT
Physical-layer authentication techniques exploit the uniq e
properties of the wireless medium to enhance traditional
higher-level authentication procedures. We propose to reduc
the higher-level authentication overhead by using a state-
of-the-art multi-target tracking technique based on Gaussi n
processes. The proposed technique has the additional advan-
tage that it is capable of automatically learning the dynamics
of the trusted user’s channel response and the time-frequency
fingerprint of intruders. Numerical simulations show very
low intrusion rates, and an experimental validation using a
wireless test bed with programmable radios demonstrates the
technique’s effectiveness.
Index Terms— wireless communications, physical-layer
authentication, gaussian processes, multi-target tracking
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems have witnessed an impres-
sive evolution during the past two decades, most significantly
in terms of data rate and reliability. Nevertheless, an areathat
still leaves room for considerable improvement is security.
The broadcast nature of the wireless channel facilitates both
the interception of data, oreavesdropping, and intrusions, or
spoofing. Traditional higher-layer security techniques are em-
ployed to prevent both types of attacks. Specifically, confi-
dentiality techniques are employed to avoid eavesdropping,
while authentication techniques aim to prevent spoofing.
We follow up on the idea that the very nature of the wire-
less medium, which may seem vulnerable to attacks at first,
can be turned into an important advantage to complement tra-
ditional security methods [1, 2, 3]. In particular, the typi-
cal multipath environment in wireless communications guar-
antees that the response of the medium along any transmit-
receive path is location-specific, and characterized by a par-
ticular frequency- and time-selectivity.
We will focus on the problem of authentication, for which
several techniques have appeared in the literature. Yu et al.
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Fig. 1. Three agents in a multipath environment with multiple
scattering surfaces.
devised a framework to transmit authentication information
concurrently by superposing a secret modulation on the wave-
form [2]. A different approach consists in authenticating the
wireless transmitter by analyzing its channel response. For
instance, Li et al. proposed a change-point detector to detect
the presence of spoofing signals in [1], and a hypothesis test
based on a realistic channel model was presented in [3].
In this paper, we propose a technique based on Gaus-
sian processes (GPs) that solves two issues found in the cur-
rent hypothesis-test based methods. First, they typicallyon
serve as a detector for intruders, and whenever an intruder
is detected they require the transmitter to re-authenticate it-
self, causing considerable overhead. And, second, the cur-
rent PHY-layer authentication techniques are based on spe-
cific channel models and they require to know all involved
parameters in order to perform correctly. The technique we
propose is capable of tracking the dynamics of the channel
by clustering the observations into trajectories, therefore re-
ducing the need for higher-level authentication when intru-
sions are detected. Furthermore, it is non-parametric in the
sense that it does not make any assumptions on the channel
responses except for smoothness, and it is capable of auto-
matically learning all parameters including the smoothness.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Using the traditional terminology, we consider three different
agents: Alice, Bob and Eve. These agents represent wireless
transmitters or receivers that are located at different position
amid several scatterers, as depicted in Fig. 1. Alice is a legit-
imate transmitter who wishes to communicate with Bob, and
Eve is a would-be intruder who transmits to Bob with the aim
of impersonating Alice.
2.1. System model
We assume that Bob measures and stores theN most recent
frequency responses of the channel between (a presumed) Al-
ice and himself. The channel response at then-th time slot,
ĥn, is stored as aD × 1 vector of samples, each correspond-
ing to a different frequency in the measurement bandwidth. A
common example of this model would be that of an orthogo-
nal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system where
pilot symbols are transmitted overD different subcarriers.
Bob stores a sliding window ofN channel responses centered
at timen, i.e. ĥi ∀i ∈ [n− N−12 , . . . , n+
N−1
2 ]. Based on the
aforementioned set of channel responses, Bob has to decide
whether the frame received at timen is coming from Alice or
Eve. Commonly, received frames will be coming from Alice
and, thus, they can be modeled as
ĥn = h
(AB)
n +w
(AB)
n , (1)
whereh(AB)n denotes the actual channel response between
Alice and Bob, which will be time-variant and frequency-
selective, andw(AB)n is the unavoidable estimation error vec-
tor which accounts for any spurious effect such thermal noise,
non-linearities, etc. We recall that entries of samplesĥn are
complex variables containing estimates of both channel am-
plitude and phase. The estimated channel phase is the addi-
tive combination of phases from two different sources: the ac-
tual channel phase and an arbitrary oscillator phase. Channel
phase will typically change smoothly over time, but the os-
cillator phase can take independent values for eachn. There-
fore, Bob will find it difficult to discriminate between both of
them and should restrict his attention to channel magnitudes
instead of complex gains. Hereinafter, we will denote byĥn
the vector containing the amplitudes of the estimated channel
response coefficients.
Given the malicious nature of Eve, she will try to perform
an attack by sending a forged message to Bob. We assume
that Eve knows the modulation scheme, the frequency/time
statistics of the channel between Alice and Bob and the de-
tails of the channel estimation and authentication technique
employed by Bob. Our assumptions are, therefore, conser-
vative and provide worst-case scenarios. It is well known
that channel responses decorrelate rapidly in space, that is,
two transmit-receive paths are decorrelated from each other if
the paths are separated by more than a radio frequency (RF)
wavelength. For that reason, Eve will not be able to know the
exact channel response of the path separating Alice and Bob
but she will be able to estimate the propagation environment
time and frequency characteristics.
Taking again a conservative viewpoint, we will assume
Eve can potentially forge, by pre-distorting her signal, any
channel response with the same characteristics as the chan-
nel between Alice and Bob. This may not be possible in
practice, for instance due to limitations on Eve’s transmision
power. The attack strategy of Eve will consist in transmitting
as many different frames per time unit as possible, emulating
a high number of different channel responses. For each of
these frames, Bob estimates a channel response that may be
written as
ĥn = h
(EB)
n +w
(EB)
n (2)
wherew(EB)n is the estimation error andh
(EB)
n is the channel
response crafted by Eve, i.e. not the actual response of the
Eve-Bob channel.
3. CHANNEL TRACKING THROUGH OMGP
In [1] a simple change-point detector was proposed to detect
interruptions in the state of the wireless channel, quantified as
ηn =
‖ĥn − ĥn−1‖
‖ĥn−1‖
. (3)
If, during the transmission of Alice, a spike inη is detected,
it is likely that another device is using the wireless channel
with the possible intention of spoofing Alice. At this point
Bob may ask Alice to re-authenticate herself by traditional
methods in order to resume the transmission. However, if at
timen+1 Alice does not re-authenticate herself, the detector
does not allow to determine who is transmitting. In [3] the
change-point detector from Eq. (3) was extended to a hypoth-
esis test for authentication that is capable of incorporating the
channel model whenever its parameters are known. Neverthe-
less, this approach faces the same limitation.
In order to circumvent this problem, we propose to track
the changes in the channel response rather than to rely only
on the last estimate of the trusted Alice-Bob channel. As a
result, when Eve is detected at time instantn it is still possible
to recognize Alice at time instant+ 1 without Alice having
to re-authenticate herself, thereby causing less overhead.
The tracking-based detector takes the following general
form:
γn = ‖ĥn − ĥ
(AB)
n ‖, (4)
whereĥ(AB)n represents the response of the channel between
Alice and Bob at timen, as estimated by the tracking algo-
rithm.
In this work we use the recently-proposed Overlapping
Mixture of Gaussian Processes (OMGP) multi-target tracking
algorithm from [4] to distinguish Alice’s and Eve’s transmis-
sions. We summarize its main characteristics below.
3.1. Trajectories as Gaussian processes
The OMGP model casts trajectories as Gaussian processes,
which are state-of-the-art Bayesian models for regressionand
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Fig. 2. GP regression on the noisy data marked by the red
crosses. The inferred latent function is shown as the blue
curve, and the grey area marks the95% confidence interval.
classification [5, 6]. Given a set ofN inputs and their cor-
responding outputs,D ≡ {xi, yi}Ni=1, the Gaussian process
regression model assumes that the observations can be mod-
eled as
y = f(x) + ǫ, (5)
where f(x) is an unobservable latent function andǫ rep-
resents zero-mean Gaussian noise. In order to perform
Bayesian inference a GP prior is placed over the latent func-
tion, chosen as a zero-mean GP with covariance function
k(xi,xj). The use of a GP prior implies that the prior joint
distribution of the vector[f(x1), f(x2), . . . , f(xn)]⊤ is a
zero-mean multivariate Gaussian with covariance matrixK,
which has elementsKij = k(xi,xj).
The covariance functionk(xi,xj) specifies the degree of
coupling betweenyi andyj , and it encodes the properties of
the GP such as power level, smoothness, etc. One of the best-
known covariance functions is the squared exponential kernel.
It has the form of an unnormalized Gaussian,k(xi,xj) =
σ20 exp
(
−‖xi − xj‖2/l
)
, and depends on the signal power
σ20 and the length-scale, which controls how fast the correla-
tion between outputs decays as the separation along the inputs
grows. We will collectively refer to all kernel parameters asθ.
Many different covariance functions can be plugged into the
GP regression framework. For instance, in the experiments
of Section 4 we will see that it may be useful to use a noise-
like covariance to model Eve’s channel in case she performs
random attacks, as opposed to Alice’s smooth trajectory.
3.2. Data association without combinatorial explosion
Given a set of observations that represent the positions of a
number of moving targets in a multi-target tracking setting,
typically cars or airplanes, data association consists of infer-
ring which observations correspond to the same target [7].
While data association is typically performed online, the re-
sults can be significantly improved by postponing decisions
until enough information is available to exclude ambiguities.
Nevertheless, this causes the number of possible trajectori s
to grow exponentially.
The OMGP model allows to avoid such combinatorial ex-
plosions, and to “cluster” observations into groups that rep-
resents trajectories. It assumes that there existM different
multi-dimensional trajectories, each of which are described
by D latent functions{f (m)d (x)}
M,D
m=1,d=1. In our case,D is
the number of subcarriers, andM is the number of targets,
which is typically2 to represent Alice and Eve, but it may be
higher when more intruders are sought. The OMGP model
assumes that each observation is produced by evaluating one
of these functions at the corresponding input and by adding
Gaussian noise to it. The association between samples and
latent functions is determined by theN × M binary indica-
tor matrixZ: Entry [Z]nm being non-zero specifies thatn-th
data point was generated using trajectorym. Only one non-
zero entry per row is allowed inZ.
All the outputs can be collected in a single matrixY =
[y1 . . .yD] and all the latent functions of trajectorym in a
single matrixF(m) = [f (m)1 . . . f
(m)
D ]. The complete set of
latent functions is denoted as{F(m)}. The likelihood of the
OMGP model is
p(Y|{F(m)},Z) =
∏
n,m,d
N ([Y]nd|[F
(m)]nd, σ
2)[Z]nm .
(6)
The posterior distributionp(Z, {F(m)}|X,Y) is obtained by
placing priors on the latent variables. Since it cannot be com-
puted analytically, the OMGP algorithm uses an efficient vari-
ational approximation technique. Details can be found [4].
In our setup, the measured channelsĥn constitute the
rows of Y, and the rows ofF(1) and F(2) correspond to
the true, unobservable channel responsesh(AB)n andh
(EB)
n ,
respectively. The time instants at which the channels are
estimated are collected inX.
3.3. Automatic parameter learning
The OMGP algorithm does not require exact information
about the tracking environment. Rather, it canlearn all in-
volved parameters from the provided data by maximizing the
likelihood of the OMGP model. An expectation maximiza-
tion (EM) algorithm to determine the involved parameters is
detailed in [4].
4. EXPERIMENTS
4.1. Simulation
The fading dispersive channel between Alice and Bob can
be characterized by its low-pass equivalent impulse response
h(t, τ) whereτ is the propagation delay andt denotes abso-
lute time. Givenh(t, τ), the power-delay profile (PDP) repre-
ents the mean power of the multipath component at delayτ ,
P (t, τ) = E[|h(t, τ)|2]. In our simulations we will consider a
Rayleigh fading channel with the classic one-sided exponen-
tial PDP [8]:
P (t, τ) =
1
σT
exp(−
τ − t
σT
) for τ − t ≥ 0, (7)
0 20
40 60
80
26
13
0
−13
−26
0
2000
4000
 
Time slot
Subcarrier index 
C
ha
nn
el
 a
m
pl
itu
de
Alice
Eve
Fig. 3. Simulated channel responses at different time slots.
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Fig. 4. Results for the simulated authentication scenarios.
where the frequency selectivity of the channel is parametriz d
by the root mean square (RMS) delay spreadσT , here chosen
asσT = 1. Similarly, in order to model the time selectivity
of the channel we use the well-known Jakes model [9] which
allows us to parametrize the time-variability of the channel
by means of a single parameterfD denoting the Doppler fre-
quency. Note that Bob does not know any of these channel
parameters. Estimation errors have been modeled as zero-
mean real Gaussian i.i.d random variables with varianceσ.
The time instants on which Alice transmits are not uniformly
spaced but determined by a Markov chain, while Eve is set to
attack at random time instants. An example scenario with the
data to track is shown in Fig. 3.
We apply the OMGP tracking algorithm on these data.
For Alice we choose a squared exponential covariance as her
channel will undergo smooth changes, and the smoothness is
determined automatically by the OMGP algorithm. For Eve
we choose a noise-like covariance (implying a diagonal co-
variance matrix), in accordance with her attack strategy. The
tracking algorithm uses a buffer ofN = 50 samples to make
a decision on a single observation. The false alarm rates and
rates of successful intrusions for different relative Doppler
spreads,fDT , can be found in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 5. Observed channel response coefficients, for Alice
and Eve, and inferred trajectories for Alice, using real-world
channel data.
4.2. Experimental validation
Any proposed PHY-layer authentication method requires the
radio equipment to provide higher layers with the estimated
channel amplitudes. In our experiments we have used the
GTAS MIMO test bed1 to transmit fully compliant 802.11a
frames from two nodes representing Alice and Eve and esti-
mate channel responses at Bob’s receiver end. Measurements
were carried out in an indoor environment at a center fre-
quency of 5.6 GHz where Alice and Eve were one meter apart
from each other and five meters apart from Bob. Additional
details on the test bed and measurement scenario can be found
in [10, 11].
Our measurements show that in spite of the proximity of
Alice and Eve, the spatial correlation between their multicar-
rier channel responses is rather low and should be enough for
discrimination. This validates our space correlation assump-
tion. Furthermore, we observed time and frequency character-
istics which are similar to those assumed in Section 4.1, thus
validating our simulation model assumptions. As an exam-
ple, Figure 5 shows the retrieved trajectories of the proposed
method under real-world channel conditions.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a methodology for physical-layer authenti-
cation that requires less overhead from higher-level authen-
tication methods compared to the currently proposed tech-
niques. Our approach is based on a GP tracking algorithm
that has the additional advantage that it is capable of automat-
ically learning the parameters of the trajectories.
We have presented simulation results that show very low
intrusion rates, and we have performed an experimental val-
idation of our approach using a wireless test bed with pro-
grammable radios.
1The GTAS MIMO test bed is a MIMO experimentation test bed which
is openly available to researchers willing to conduct theirown PHY-layer
experiments through an online interface.
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